Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in stochastic differential games as solution of a generalized Euler Equations System by Josa-Fombellida, Ricardo & Rincón-Zapatero, Juan Pablo
  
 
Working Paper 08-67 Departamento de Economía  
Economic Series (31) Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
November 2008 Calle Madrid, 126 
 28903 Getafe (Spain) 
 Fax (34) 916249875 
 
 
Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in Stochastic Differential 
Games as Solution of a Generalized Euler Equations System1 
 
RICARDO JOSA–FOMBELLIDA2 and JUAN PABLO RINCÓN–ZAPATERO3 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper gives a new method to characterize Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in stochastic 
differential games by means of a set of Generalized Euler Equations. Necessary and sufficient 
conditions are given. 
 
 
Keywords: Stochastic differential games, dynamic programming, Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman 
equation, semilinear parabolic equation, stochastic productive assets. 
 
Journal of Economic Literature classification: C61, C73, E21. 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia and 
FEDER funds under project MTM2005-06534. 
2 Departamento de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, Universidad de Valladolid, Spain. E-mail: 
ricar@eio.uva.es. 
3 Corresponding author. Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; C/ Madrid 126-128, 
28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain. E-mail: jrincon@eco.uc3m.es. 
 
1 Introduction
The paper develops a new approach that characterizes directly Markov Perfect Nash Equilib-
rium (MPNE) in stochastic differential games as solution of a system of semilinear partial
differential equations (PDEs), that can be seen as a set of Generalized Euler Equations
(GEEs). That is, we obtain the counterpart for the continuous time case of the Euler
equations for discrete dynamic programming. This system is obtained from the optimality
conditions of the stochastic maximum principle.
The main antecedents of this aproach date back to the paper Bourdache–Siguerdidjane
and Fliess (1987) for deterministic control problems, Rinco´n–Zapatero, Mart´ınez and Mart´ın–
Herra´n (1998) and Rinco´n–Zapatero (2004), in deterministic differential games, and Josa–
Fombellida and Rinco´n–Zapatero (2007), in stochastic control. The aim of this paper is
to extend this methodology to an important class of stochastic differential games, which
presents the following characteristics: (i) the diffusion coefficient in the state variable pro-
cess is independent of the strategies of the players, (ii) the MPNE is interior and smooth,
and (iii) the number of strategies of each player is greater than or equal to the number of
state variables. These characteristics appear in some important models arising in economics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the differential game and
the first definitions, hypotheses and notations. In Section 3 the GEE system characterizing
MPNE is presented as a new necessary condition, and some interesting consequences are
deduced, as the possibility of jumps in the first order derivatives of the MPNE. In Section
4 we establish sufficient conditions for MPNE in terms of the GEE system and a concavity
property of the Hamiltonians of the players. Some applications come in Section 5: (i)
determination of robust equilibria, (ii) identification of games with constant MPNE, and (iii)
some remarks on a game of competition for consumption of a productive asset. Concluding
remarks are stated in Section 6.
2 The game formulation
In this section we establish the formulation for the stochastic differential games considered
along the paper. We shall use the following notation. The partial derivatives are indicated
by subscripts and ∂x stands for total derivation; the partial derivative of a scalar function
with respect to a vector is a column vector; given a real vector function g : Rn −→ Rm and
a vector z ∈ Rn, gz is defined as the matrix (∂gi/∂zj)i,j ; for a matrix A, A(i) denotes the
ith column and Aij denotes the (i, j) element; vectors v ∈ Rn are column vectors and vi is
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the ith component; > denotes transposition; finally, for z ∈ R, x ∈ Rn and j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
we denote (z|x−j) = (x1, . . . , xj−1, z, xj+1, . . . , xn).
We consider an N–person differential game over a fixed and bounded time interval
[0, T ] with 0 < T ≤ ∞. Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space. Assume that
on this space a d–dimensional Brownian motion {w(t),Ft}t∈[0,T ] is defined with {Ft}t∈[0,T ]
being the Brownian filtration. Let E denote expectation under the probability measure P.
We also consider the function space L2F ([0, T ];Rn) of all processes X(·) with values in Rn
adapted to filtration {Ft}t≥0 such that E
∫ T
0 ‖X(t)‖2 dt <∞.
The state space is Rn and the set of admissible profiles of the players is some subset
U = U1 × U2 × · · · × UN , where U i ⊆ Rmi , with4 mi = n, for all i = 1, . . . , N . A U–
valued process of strategic profiles {(u(s);Fs) = ((u1(s), u2(s), . . . , uN (s));Fs)} defined on
[t, T ]× Ω is an Fs–progressively measurable map (r, ω)→ u(r, ω) from [t, s]× Ω into U ,
that is, u(t, ω) is Bs×Fs–measurable for each s ∈ [t, T ], where Bs denotes the Borel σ–field
in [t, s]. For simplicity, we will denote u(t) to u(t, ω).
The state process ξ ∈ Rn satisfies the system of controlled stochastic differential equa-
tions (SDEs)
dξ(s) = f(s, ξ(s), u(s)) ds+ σ(s, ξ(s)) dw(s), t ≤ s ≤ T, (1)
with initial condition ξ(t) = x, t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn. Observe that the diffusion coefficient,
σ, is independent of the control variable, u. The functions f : [0, T ]× Rn × U −→ Rn and
σ : [0, T ] × Rn −→ Rn×d are both assumed to be of class C2 with respect to (x, u) and
of class C1 with respect to t. Since our aim is to work with the MPNE concept, we will
consider the game for every initial condition (t, x).
Definition 2.1 (Admissible strategies) A strategic profile
{(u(t);Ft)}t∈[0,T ] = {((u1(t), u2(t), . . . , uN (t));Ft)}t∈[0,T ] is called admissible if
(i) for every (t, x) the system of SDEs (1) with initial condition ξ(t) = x admits a pathwise
unique strong solution;
(ii) for each i = 1, . . . , N, there exists some function φi : [0, T ]× Rn −→ U i of class C1,2
such that ui is in relative feedback to φi, i.e. ui(s) = φi(s, ξ(s)) for every s ∈ [0, T ].
Let U i(t, x) denote the set of admissible strategies of player i and U = U1×· · ·×UN the set
of admissible strategies profiles, corresponding to the initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
4The case mi > n could also be analyzed, by means of a reduction to the case mi = n as in Josa–
Fombellida and Rinco´n–Zapatero (2007).
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Part (ii) in Definition 2.1 means that players use Markov strategies. When φi is time
independent, we will say that the strategy is a stationary Markovian strategy.
The instantaneous utility function of player i is denoted by Li and his or her bequest
function by Si. Given initial conditions (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn and an admissible strategic
profile u, the payoff function of each player (to be maximized) is given by
J i(t, x;u) = Etx
{∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t) Li(s, ξ(s), u(s)) ds+ e−ρ
i(T−t)Si(T, ξ(T ))
}
, (2)
where Etx denotes conditional expectation with respect to the initial condition (t, x). In
the following, the subscript will be eliminated if there is no confusion. The functions
Li : [0, T ] × Rn × U −→ R and Si : [0, T ] × Rn −→ R, i = 1, . . . , N , are both of class C2
with respect to (x, u) and of class C1 with respect to t. The constant ρi ≥ 0 is the rate
of discount. J i(t, x;u) denotes the utility obtained by player i when the game starts at
(t, x) and the profile of strategies is u. Given that our aim is to solve the problem for every
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, U will often be written instead of U(t, x).
In the infinite horizon case the bequest functions Si are null. In this case, if the problem
is autonomous and the strategies are Markov stationary, the value function is independent
of time, and the initial condition is simply x.
In a non-cooperative setting the aim of the players is to maximize their individual payoff
J i. Since this aspiration depends on the strategies selected by the other players also, it is
generally impossible to attain5. An adequate concept of solution is Nash equilibrium, which
prevents unilateral deviations of the players from its recommendation of play.
Definition 2.2 (MPNE) An N–tuple of strategies φ̂ ∈ U is called a Markov perfect Nash
equilibrium if for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, for every φi ∈ U i
J i(t, x; (φi|φ̂−i)) ≤ J i(t, x; φ̂),
for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Remember that (φi|φ̂−i) denotes (φ̂1, . . . , φ̂i−1, φi, φ̂i−1, . . . , φ̂N ). Note that with a MPNE
no player has incentives to deviate unilaterally from the equilibrium, whatever the initial
condition (t, x) is.
The standard approach adopted in the literature to determine a MPNE is to solve the
5But in some models the MPNE is also Pareto optimal; see Mart´ın–Herra´n and Rinco´n–Zapatero (2005).
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HJB system of PDEs
ρiV i(s, x) = V it (s, x) + max
ui∈U i
{
H i(s, x, (ui|φ−i), V ix(s, x))
}
+
1
2
Tr
{
(σσ>V ixx)(s, x)
}
, (3)
V i(T, x) = Si(T, x), t ≤ s ≤ T, (4)
where H i is the (current–value) deterministic Hamiltonian function of the ith player, cor-
responding to the associated deterministic problem with σ ≡ 0,
H i(s, x, u, pi) = Li(s, x, u) + (pi)>f(s, x, u),
for all i = 1, . . . , N , for every initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn. Denote by φ̂ =
(φ̂1, . . . , φ̂N ), with φ̂i(t, x) = φi0(t, x, V
1
x (t, x), . . . , V
N
x (t, x)) an argument maximizing the
right–hand side in (3), for all i. A classical result establishes that if V = (V 1, . . . , V N ) is a
solution to (3)–(4) of class C1,2, then φ̂ is an MPNE of class C1,2; see Dockner et al (2000),
Theorem 8.5.
Definition 2.3 (Value functions) Let φ̂ be a MPNE of the game. The value function V i
of the ith player is
V i(t, x) = max
φi∈U i
{
J i(t, x; (φi|φ̂−i)) : dξ(s) = f(s, ξ(s), (φi|φ̂−i)(s, ξ(s))) ds+ σ(s, ξ(s)) dw(s),
ξ(t) = x, ∀s ∈ [t, T ]
}
,
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, for all i = 1, . . . , N.
It is known that under suitable smoothness conditions, V = (V 1, . . . , V N ) satisfies problem
(3)–(4).
Now we consider the associated deterministic game to the initial stochastic game, that
is, making σ = 0, so that the state equation is
ξ˙(s) = f(s, ξ(s), u(s)), t ≤ s ≤ T, (5)
with initial condition ξ(t) = x, t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ Rn. The objective of the ith player is to
maximize
J i(t, x;u) =
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)Li(s, ξ(s), u(s)) ds+ e−ρ
i(T−t)Si(T, ξ(T )), i = 1, . . . , N, (6)
once the remainder players have fixed their strategies u−i.
Definition 2.4 (Robust MPNE) A MPNE of the associated deterministic game (5), (6) is
robust if it is a MPNE of the stochastic game (1), (2).
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It is not easy to obtain a condition to robust equilibrium directly from HJB system since
the value functions of the respective problems, deterministic and stochastic are, in general,
different.
3 Necessary conditions for MPNE
We deduce in this section a set of GEEs that a smooth interior MPNE must satisfy. This new
system consists of PDEs of semilinear type, and constitutes an alternative to the classical
HJB system.
Given the initial condition (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn, let us suppose φ̂ ∈ U is a MPNE of the
game. More specifically consider (ξ̂, φ̂) ∈ L2F ([0, T ];Rn) × U [t, x], where ξ̂ is the optimal
state process corresponding to φ̂. Then for every i = 1, . . . , N , φ̂i ∈ U i is an optimal Markov
control of problem
max
φi∈U i
J i(t, x; (φi|φ̂−i)), (7)
subject to (1). We suppose that the data of the game are regular enough to apply the
stochastic maximum principle; see Assumption A1 in Josa–Fombellida and Rinco´n–Zapatero
(2007) or Yong and Zhou (1999), p. 114. Thus, there exist square integrable processes
pi ∈ L2F ([0, T ];Rn), qi ∈
(
L2F ([0, T ];Rn)
)d satisfying for s ∈ [t, T ] the first order adjoint
equations
dpi(s) =
ρipi(s)− ∂xH i(s, ξ̂(s), φ̂(s, ξ̂(s)), pi(s))− d∑
j=1
(σ(j))x(s, ξ̂(s))>(q(j))i(s)
 ds
+ qi(s) dw(s), (8)
pi(T ) = Six(T, ξ̂(T )), (9)
for each i = 1, . . . , N . Notice that we are considering current–value adjoint variables, and
that they depend on (t, x): pi(s; t, x), qi(s; t, x) with s ∈ [t, T ]. Most often we will suppress
this dependence in the notation to facilitate the exposition. On the other hand, in (8) we
have used the total derivation symbol, ∂xH i, instead of partial derivation. This is correct
in our framework, since we are supposing that φ̂ is smooth and the MPNE is interior. In
these circumstances,
∂xH
i = H ix +
N∑
j 6=i
H iuj φ̂
j
x +H
i
ui φ̂
i
x
coincides with the usual term H ix of the one–player case, because H
i
ui
= 0 for interior
MPNE by the maximum principle; see (11) below. In the game with N players, the term
6
∑N
j 6=iH
i
uj
φ̂jx must be added to H ix. Both possibilities are handled using ∂xH
i into the
expression defining dpi.
Definition 3.1 (Adjoint feedback) A function γi : [0, T ] × Rn → Rn is called an adjoint
feedback of the ith player if it express the adjoint process pi in terms of the state variable ξ,
pi(s) = γi(s, ξ(s)).
The following maximization condition holds for every6 s ∈ [t, T ], P a.s.
∀i = 1, . . . , N, Hi(s, ξ̂(s), φ̂(s, ξ̂(s)), pi(s)) = max
ui∈U i
H i(s, ξ̂(s), (ui|φ̂−i)(s, ξ̂(s)), pi(s)).
(10)
Since we have imposed that the maximizing argument φ̂i is interior to U i, (10) implies
∀i = 1, . . . , N, H iui(s, ξ̂(s), φ̂(s, ξ(s)), pi(s)) = 0, ∀s ∈ [t, T ], P a.s.. (11)
Assuming that fui is invertible for all (t, x, u) ∈ [0, T ]×Rn×U , it is possible to obtain the
adjoint variable pi as the unique solution of the above algebraic linear system, Li
ui
+f>
ui
pi = 0
∀i = 1, . . . , N, pi = −f−>
ui
Liui .
Define for each player the adjoint function Γi on [0, T ]× Rn × U by
Γi(t, x, u) := −f−>
ui
Liui(t, x, u). (12)
Note that if γi is an adjoint feedback and φ̂ is an optimal control then γi(t, x) =
Γi(t, x, φ̂(t, x)), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn.
Next result establishes a necessary condition for MPNE in terms of a new system of
PDEs. As stated at the beginning of this section, the system can be seen as composed
of GEEs which are the counterpart to the continuous case of those appearing in discrete–
time dynamic programming. We state the theorem only for the finite horizon case, and
afterwards we make some remarks concerning the infinite horizon case.
Theorem 3.1 (Necessary condition) Suppose, for all i = 1, . . . , N , that γi is an adjoint
feedback and φ̂ ∈ U is an interior MPNE, both continuous on [0, T ] × Rn and of class C1,2
on [0, T )× Rn. Then φ̂ satisfies the semilinear system of PDEs of second order
ρiΓi(t, x, φ(t, x))
= ∂tΓi(t, x, φ(t, x)) + ∂x
(
Hi(t, x, φ(t, x)) + 1
2
Tr
{
σ(t, x)σ(t, x)>∂xΓi(t, x, φ(t, x))
})
,
(13)
6That is, fixed (s, ξ(s)), the MPNE is a Nash equilibrium of the static game with payoff Hi for each
player, i = 1, . . . , N .
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where Hi(t, x, u) := H i(t, x, u,Γi(t, x, u)), with terminal condition
Liui(T, x, φ(T, x)) + S
i
x(T, x)
>fui(T, x, φ(T, x)) = 0, (14)
for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. As φ̂ ∈ U is a MPNE of the game, then φ̂i ∈ U i is an interior optimal Markov
control of problem (1), (7), for all i = 1, . . . , N , when the equilibrium strategies of the other
players, φ̂−i, are fixed.
Consider player ith; by hypothesis γi is a function of class C1,2. Applying Itoˆ’s rule to
pi(s) = γi(s, ξ̂(s)), t ≤ s ≤ T , we obtain
dpi(s) =
(
γis + γ
i
xf +
1
2
Tr{σσ>γixx}
)
ds+ γixσdw(s), s ∈ [t, T ], (15)
where the arguments have been eliminated to simplify the notation. Thus, equating the
diffusion parameters of (8) and (15) we obtain
qi = γixσ; (16)
and equating now the drift terms of (8) and (15),
ρiγi = γis + γ
i
xf +
1
2
Tr{σσ>γixx}+ ∂xLi + γi∂xf +
d∑
j=1
(σ(j))>x (q
(j))i. (17)
Inserting (16) in (17), for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn we obtain
ρiγi = γis + ∂x
(
Li + (γi)>f +
1
2
Tr{σσ>γix}
)
.
Now, taking limits s → t we obtain (13). Finally, the terminal condition (14) is obtained
from the stochastic maximum principle, concretely using (9) and (12). ¤
Observe that the dependent variables (unknowns) in system (13) are φ1, . . . , φN and t, x
are the independent variables. The system is formed by n × N PDEs of semilinear type,
meaning that the second order derivatives appear linearly. Notice that the nonlinearity
affect the first derivative in a very specific way, because they appear at the square, (φix)
2.
This can be seen taking the total derivatives; see Section 5.3 below for specific examples.
In comparison, the HJB system (3) consists of N equations and it is also of semilinear type,
but the non linearity with respect to φix can be much more general and not only of quadratic
type.
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Remark 3.1 (Infinite horizon). System (13) is also valid for the infinite horizon case,
T = ∞, but the final condition (14) obviously does not apply now. As it is well known
in the literature, this makes possible the existence of multiple smooth solutions and a
tranversality condition must be used in order to isolate the correct solution. For autonomous
problems and stationary Markov strategies, ∂tΓ(x, φ(x)) = 0, thus the GEE system reduces
to: ∀i = 1, . . . , N ,
ρiΓi(x, φ(t, x)) = ∂x
(
Hi(x, φ(t, x)) + 1
2
Tr
{
σ(x)σ(x)>∂xΓi(x, φ(t, x))
})
, (18)
which in the scalar case, n = 1, is in fact a coupled system of second order ordinary
differential equations.
The special structure of the system (13) allows us to consider solutions–in a generalized
sense– with jumps in the first derivatives. Let us show the method in the scalar case, with
infinite horizon, T =∞, and on an autonomous problem. Suppose that φ = (φ1, . . . , φN ) is
a classical solution in a punctured open interval around some x = z, that φi is continuous
at z, and that both side limits φix(z−) = limx→z− φix(x), φix(z+) = limx→z+ φix(x) exist for
every i = 1, . . . , N , although possibly φjx(z−) 6= φjx(z+) for some j = 1, . . . , N . That is, the
strategy of some player may experience a jump in the first derivative at x = z. If (18) is
integrated with respect to x in an interval [z− ε, z− ε] with ε > 0, then using Barrow’s rule
and taking limits as ε→ 0, we get
∀i = 1, . . . , N, σ(z)σ(z)>
N∑
j=1
Γiuj (z, φ(z))
(
φjx(z+)− φjx(z−)
)
= 0. (19)
In the degenerated case σ(z)σ(z)> = 0, this does not impose any condition in the jump,
and makes clear why non–smooth solutions may appear when σ(z)σ(z)> = 0 at some z.
Letting aside this situation, (19) imposes a necessary condition for jumps in the derivatives
of a MPNE. Thus, we have proved the following result
Proposition 3.1 (Jumps). In the autonomous scalar game with infinite horizon, suppose
that φ is a continuous MPNE profile, which is smooth except at some z, and such that
φix(z±) exist. Suppose also that σ(z)σ(z)> 6= 0. Then, φx satisfies the jump condition
∀i = 1, . . . , N,
N∑
j=1
Γiuj (z, φ
1(z), . . . , φN (z))
(
φjx(z+)− φjx(z−)
)
= 0.
Consider now the frequent case in applications where Γi
uj
= 0 for j 6= i and Γi
ui
6= 0, see
Section 5.3 below. Then, it is obvious that the MPNE cannot have jumps in the first order
derivatives.
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4 Sufficient conditions and connection with the HJB system
In this section we show that a solution φ̂ of class C1,2 of the semilinear system (13), (14),
maximizing the deterministic hamiltonian for all (t, x), is a MPNE of the differential game.
For each player i and for an admissible strategy φ̂ solving the GEE system we define
the adjoint feedback of the ith player γi(t, x) = Γi(t, x, φ̂(t, x)) = −f−>
ui
Li
ui
(t, x, φ̂(t, x)), for
all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn. We also establish the connection existing between the GEE system
(13), (14), and the HJB system (3), (4).
The following result establishes that, for each ith player, the adjoint process pi(s) =
γi(s, ξ(s)) is the gradient with respect to x of the objective functional, J ix(s, ξ(s); φ̂). This
result, of independent interest, is a previous step in the formulation of the sufficiency the-
orem that will be stated later. For the result it is needed to impose a technical condition,
consisting in that the processes (Bi)jk, for i = 1, . . . , N , j, k = 1, . . . , n, defined in the proof
below, is square integrable. We give the proof for the finite horizon case, and then a remark
concerning the infinite horizon case.
Proposition 4.1 (Shadow prices) Let φ̂ ∈ U be a solution of class C1,2 of (13), (14). Then
J i is twice differentiable with respect to x and the derivatives are
J ix(t, x; φ̂) = γ
i(t, x) = pi(t),
J ixx(t, x; φ̂)σ(t, x) = q
i(t),
for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn and for every i = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. Consider player ith, and a smooth solution φ̂ of (13), (14). By the hypotheses γi
is a function of class C1,2, thus we can use the Itoˆ’s formula with process pi(s) = γi(s, ξ(s)),
t ≤ s ≤ T , and obtain (15). From (16), (qi)jk =∑nl=1(γi)jxlσlk.
Denote by ξx the n× n matrix of partial derivatives, ξjxk , of ξj with respect to xk. This
process ξx satisfies the linear system of stochastic differential equations
dξx(s) = fyξx ds+ σyξxdw(s), t ≤ s ≤ T,
with ξx(t) = In×n, see Fleming and Rishel (1975), p. 174. Thus every ξ
j
xr satisfies the linear
system of stochastic differential equations
dξjxr =
n∑
l=1
f j
xl
ξlxr ds+
d∑
k=1
n∑
l=1
σjk
xl
ξlxrdw
k(s), (20)
with ξjxr(t) = δrj , with δrj denoting Kronecker’s delta.
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Applying the Itoˆ’s formula, the product ξjxr(p
i)j satisfies the following SDE
d(ξjxr(p
i)j) = (pi)jdξjxr + ξ
j
xrd(p
i)j + (Ai)rj ds, (21)
where (Ai)rj :=
∑d
k=1
∑n
l=1 σ
jk
xl
ξlxr(q
i)jk. Analogously the product e−ρi(s−t)ξjxr(pi)j satisfies
the SDE
d(e−ρ
i(s−t)ξjxr(p
i)j) = e−ρ
i(s−t)
(
−ρiξjxr(pi)j + d(ξjxr(pi)j)
)
. (22)
Now by means of a simple calculation using (15), (20), (21), (22) and (13) the following
equality holds
n∑
j=1
d(e−ρ
i(s−t)ξjxr(p
i)j) = e−ρ
i(s−t)
(
−
n∑
j=1
Lxjξ
j
xr ds+
d∑
k=1
(Bi)rk dwk(s)
)
, (23)
with (Bi)rk :=
∑n
j=1
∑n
l=1(σ
jk
xl
ξjxr(p
i)j + (qi)jkξjxr). Taking conditional expectation with
respect to the initial condition (t, x) in (23) we obtain
n∑
j=1
Etx
{
e−ρ
i(T−t)ξjxr(T )(p
i)j(T )
}
=
n∑
j=1
Etx
{
ξjxr(t)(p
i)j(t)
}
− Etx

∫ T
t
n∑
j=1
e−ρ
i(s−t)Lixj
(
s, ξ(s), φ̂(s, ξ(s))
)
ξjxr(s) ds
 , (24)
since we are supposing that (Bi)rk are all square integrable.
Obviously,
∑n
j=1 Etx
{
ξjxr(t)(p
i)j(t)
}
= (pi)r(t) and because φ̂ satisfies the final condi-
tion (14), the equality
n∑
j=1
Etx
{
e−ρ
i(T−t)ξjxr(T )(p
i)j(T )
}
=
n∑
j=1
Etx
{
e−ρ
i(T−t)Sixj (T, ξ(T ))ξ
j
xr(T )
}
holds. The following step is to interchange the order of integration and derivation and also
the expectation operator in (24) to obtain
(γi)r(t, x) = (γi)r(t, ξ(t))
= (pi)r(t)
=
∂
∂xr
Etx
{∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)Li
(
s, ξ(s), φ̂(s, ξ(s))
)
ds+ e−ρ
i(T−t)Si(T, ξ(T ))
}
= J ixr(t, x; φ̂),
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for all r = 1, . . . , n.
Finally, note that J ixx(t, x; φ̂)σ(t, x) = γ
i
x(t, x)σ(t, x) = q
i(t). ¤
Remark 4.1 (Infinite horizon) In the case T =∞, further conditions are needed in order
to assure the identities in Proposition 4.1. These conditions can be obtained by the same
method as in the proof, letting T → ∞, and having into account that no final condition
exists. We get now from (24)
(pi)r(t) =
∂
∂xr
Etx
{∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)Li
(
s, ξ(s), φ̂(s, ξ(s))
)
ds
}
+
n∑
j=1
Etx
{
e−ρ
i(T−t)ξjxr(T )(p
i)j(T )
}
.
Thus, to show (pi)r(t) = J ixr(t, x; φ̂) in the infinite horizon case, we need to impose conver-
gence of the first summand as T →∞, as well as the transversality condition
∀i = 1, . . . , N,∀j = 1, . . . , n, lim
T→∞
Etx
{
e−ρ
i(T−t)(pi)j(T ) ξjxr(T )
}
= 0.
Once we have the identification of the adjoint variables with the gradient of the objective
functional, we have that γi is the gradient with respect to the variable x of the function
J i(t, x; φ̂), which is of class C3. In consequence, (γi)k
xl
= (γi)l
xk
is satisfied for every k, l =
1, . . . , n, because the crossed second order partial derivatives of the function J i coincide.
Now we are in position to establish the following sufficient condition for optimality. For
u ∈ U and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, we denote hi,u(t, x) = Hi(t, x, u), for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn. As in
previous results, we state the result only for the finite horizon case.
Theorem 4.1 (Value functions and sufficient conditions for MPNE) Let φ̂ be an admissible
control satisfying (13), (14), and such that
∀i = 1, . . . , N,∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn,∀φi ∈ U i, hi,φ̂(t, x) ≥ hi,(φi|φ̂−i))(t, x). (25)
Then, for each i = 1, . . . , N , and for any arbitrary constant α, the functions W i given by
W i(t, x) =
∫ xj
α
(γi)j(t, (z|x−j))dz + (gi)j(t, (α|x−j)), (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rn, (26)
where, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the functions (gi)j satisfy
(gi)j(t, (α|x−j)) = e−ρi(T−t)Si(T, (α|x−j))
+
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)
(
hi(s, (α|x−j)) + 12 Tr
{
(σσ>γix)(s, (α|x−j))
})
ds,
(27)
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are solutions of class C1,3 of the HJB system and satisfies the final condition W i(T, x) =
S(T, x). Moreover, if γi is polynomially bounded, then W i = V i is the value function of the
ith player, and φ̂ is a MPNE.
Proof. It is obvious that W i, defined in (26), is a function of class C1,3 and it is unambigu-
ously defined, because the integrability condition (γi)k
xl
= (γi)l
xk
holds for all k, l = 1, . . . , n,
as was stated immediately after Proposition 4.1. Our purpose is to prove that W i satisfies
the HJB equation (3) and final condition (4). Let us check that W i
xk
(t, x) = (γi)k(t, x) for
k = 1, . . . , n whichever index j is taken in (26). In the case where k = j this is obvious. For
k 6= j
W ixk(t, x) =
∫ xj
α
(γi)j
xk
(t, (z|x−j)) dz + (gi)jxk(t, (α|x−j))
=
∫ xj
α
(γi)kxj (t, (z|x−j)) dz + (gi)jxk(t, (α|x−j))
= (γi)k(t, x)− (γi)k(t, (α|x−j)) + (gi)jxk(t, (α|x−j)) = (γi)k(t, x).
The latter equality comes from (gi)j
xk
(t, (α|x−j)) = (γi)k(t, (α|x−j)) for k 6= j. Let us prove
this claim. Considering the expression given in (27) and deriving partially with respect to
xk we have
(gi)j
xk
(t, (α|x−j)) = e−ρi(T−t)Sixk(T, (α|x−j))
+
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)
(
hi(s, (α|x−j)) + 12 Tr{(σσ
>γix)(s, (α|x−j))}
)
xk
ds
= e−ρ
i(T−t)Sixk(T, (α|x−j)) +
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)
(
− (γi)kt + ρi(γi)k
)
(s, (α|x−j)) ds
= e−ρ
i(T−t)Sixk(T, (α|x−j))− e−ρ
i(s−t)(γi)k(s, (α|x−j))
]T
t
=(γi)k(t, (α|x−j)).
The second equality is due to (13) and the last because Si
xk
coincides with (γi)k at the final
time T , as it is established by the maximum principle. Therefore, the function W i defined
in (26) satisfies W ix = γ
i and then W ixx = γ
i
x.
Integrating with respect to xj in (13) and exchanging the order of integration and
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derivation, we have (in terms of γi = Γi(·, ·, φ̂)):
−ρi
∫ xj
α
(γi)j(t, (z|x−j)) dz + ∂
∂t
∫ xj
α
(γi)j(t, (z|x−j)) dz +Hi(t, x, φ̂(t, x))
− hi(t, (α|x−j)) + 12 Tr{(σσ
>γix)(t, x)} −
1
2
Tr{(σσ>γix)(t, (α|x−j) = 0
for j = 1, . . . , n. Therefore,
−ρi
∫ xj
α
(γi)j(t, (z|x−j)) dz +W it (t, x)− (gi)jt (t, (α|x−j)) +Hi(t, x, φ̂(t, x))
− hi(t, (α|x−j)) + 12 Tr{(σσ
>W ixx)(t, x)} −
1
2
Tr
{
(σσ>γix)(s, (α|x−j)
}
= 0, (28)
because (26) implies ∂∂t
∫ xj
α (γ
i)j dz =W it − (gi)jt . It is immediate then that (28) reduces to:
−ρiW i(t, x) +W it (t, x) + Li(t, x, φ̂(t, x))
+W ix(t, x)
>f(t, x, φ̂(t, x)) +
1
2
Tr{(σσ>W ixx)}(t, x) = 0, (29)
because (gi)jt = ρ
i(gi)j − (hi + 12 Tr{σσ>γix}). On the other hand, (25) allows us to deduce
Li(t, x,φ̂(t, x)) +W ix(t, x)
>f(t, x, φ̂(t, x)) +
1
2
Tr{(σσ>W ixx)(t, x)}
≥Li(t, x, (ui|φ̂−i)) +W ix(t, x)>f(t, x, (ui|φ̂−i)) +
1
2
Tr{(σσ>W ixx)(t, x)}, (30)
for all ui ∈ U i. Thus, (29) and (30) imply (3). The final condition, W i(T, x) = Si(T, x), is
satisfied by definition of the function (gi)j .
Finally, the independence of W i with respect to the constant α is deduced by satisfying
that the derivative of W i with respect to α is zero,
W iα(t, x) =− (γi)j(t, (α|x−j)) + e−ρ
i(T−t)Sixj (T, (α|x−j)) +
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)hixj (s, (α|x−j)) ds
+
1
2
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)
(
Tr{(σσ>γix)(s, (α|x−j)}
)
xj
ds
= e−ρ
i(s−t)(γi)j(s, (α|x−j))
]T
t
+
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)∂xj
(
hi +
1
2
Tr{σσ>γix}
)
(s, (α|x−j)) ds
=
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)
(
−ρi(γi)j + (γi)js + ∂xj
(
hi +
1
2
Tr{σσ>γix}
))
(s, (α|x−j)) ds = 0,
where the second equality holds because e−ρi(s−t)(γi)j
]T
t
=
∫ T
t ∂s
(
e−ρi(s−t)(γi)j
)
ds and the
last equality is implied by (13).
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To continue with the proof, if γi is polynomially bounded, then W i is also, hence to get
that W i is the value function of player i and φ̂ is indeed a MPNE; applying a verification
theorem of Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999), Theorem 6.27, or Dockner et al (2000), Theorem 8.5.
¤
Remark 4.2 (Concavity condition) Condition (25) is satisfied when φ̂ is interior to the
control set U and the Hamiltonian function of the ith player is concave with respect to ui,
for every t, x, pi. To see this, note that H i
ui
(t, x, φ̂,Γi(t, x, φ̂)) = 0 is trivially fulfilled by the
definition of Γi, hence φ̂i is a critical point of the concave function ui 7→ H i(·, ·, (ui|φ̂−i), ·),
so φ̂i is a global maximum of H i.
Remark 4.3 (Infinite horizon) Theorem 4.1 can be extended to the infinite–horizon case,
T =∞, adding the transversality condition
∀i = 1, . . . , N, lim sup
T→∞
Etx
{
e−ρ
i(T−t)V i(T, ξ(φ
i|φ̂−i)(T ))
}
= 0,
for all φi ∈ U i. This follows from e.g. Dockner et al. (2000), Theorem 8.5.
In the autonomous case with stationary Markov strategies, the value functions are given
by
∀i = 1, . . . , N, V i(x) =
∫ xj
α
(γi)j(z|x−j) dz + (gi)j(α|x−j), (31)
for j = 1, . . . , n, where the functions (gi)j satisfy (with ρi > 0):
(gi)j(α|x−j) = 1
ρi
(
hi +
1
2
Tr{σσ>γix}
)
(α|x−j). (32)
As in the finite horizon case, it is easy to check that the expression for V i is well defined
and is independent on the constant α.
Remark 4.4 (Particular cases) In the deterministic case, σ = 0, the system of partial
differential equations (13) is of first order. Clearly, the results remain valid now for C1
solutions. The system was obtained in Rinco´n–Zapatero, Mart´ınez, and Mart´ın–Herra´n
(1998) and further explored in Rinco´n–Zapatero (2004) for deterministic differential games.
Previously, it was found in deterministic optimal control in Bourdache–Siguerdidjane and
Fliess (1987). The stochastic control case, where N = 1, is studied in Josa–Fombellida and
Rinco´n–Zapatero (2007).
15
5 Applications
5.1 Robust MPNE
In the following proposition we establish a necessary condition for a robust MPNE to exist.
It can be seen as a certainty equivalence principle for the class of stochastic differential
games studied in this paper. Notice that we do not confine ourselves to the familiar linear–
quadratic case (see Bas¸ar and Olsder (1999) Corollary 6.12).
Proposition 5.1 (Robust equilibria) Suppose φ̂ is a robust MPNE of the deterministic
game. Then there exist functions Ai(t) such that
∀i = 1, . . . , N, ∀t ∈ [0, T ), Tr{σσ>(t, x)∂xΓi(t, x, φ̂(t, x))} = Ai(t). (33)
Moreover, when T <∞ there exist constants Ai(T ) such that
∀i = 1, . . . , N, Tr{σσ>(T, x)Sixx(T, x)} = Ai(T ). (34)
Proof. The proof is trivial based in the GEEs found for the stochastic and the deterministic
game associated. Denote by Γi,det the adjoint variable of the player i of the associated
deterministic game (σ = 0), for i = 1, . . . , N . In both games Γi = Γi,det = −f−>
ui
Li
ui
, for
all i = 1, . . . , N ; see (12). On the other hand, as φ̂ is a MPNE of both the deterministic
and the stochastic game, (13) implies (33). To finish the proof, notice that (34) is obtained
from (33) by continuity of the involved functions and derivatives, and the final condition
(14). ¤
The set of conditions (34), which apply when T is finite, place a strong link7 between
the bequest function Si of each player and the diffusion matrix, σ, and may serve as a
criterium for disregard robust equilibrium in games where (34) is not fulfilled. Obviously,
this has no effect in the infinite horizon case.
Remark 5.1 In the one dimensional case, n = 1, (33) can be made more operative: If φ̂ is
a robust MPNE of the deterministic game, then there exist functions Ai(t) such that
∀i = 1, . . . , N, Liui(t, x, φ̂(t, x)) = −Ai(t)Θ(t, x)fui(t, x, φ̂(t, x)), (35)
where Θ(t, x) a primitive of 1/σσ>(t, x) with respect to x. This fact will be used in Section
5.3.2 where we determine utility functions Li leading to robust MPNE in a game non–
cooperative game of productive assets.
7A notable exception occurs when Si is linear in x for every i; see Sorger (1989) for an interesting
application to advertising.
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5.2 Games with constant MPNE
Suppose N = 2, n = 1, U i = R, constant discount ρi > 0 for i = 1, 2, infinite horizon
(T =∞) and that the following structure on the data of the game
∀i = 1, 2, Li(t, x, ui) = hi(x)`i(ui),
f(x, u1, u2) = g1(x)f1(u1) + g2(x)f2(u2),
where all the functions involved are of class C2. Assume that f ′1, f ′2, g1 and g2 are different
from zero and that the Hamiltonian of each player is concave with respect to own strategy
ui. Furthermore, suppose:
(i) there exists a constant A satisfying g2(x)/g1(x) = A;
(ii) there exists a unique constant profile (λ1, λ2) such that
`1(λ1)f ′1(λ
1)− `′1(λ1)(f1(λ1) +Af2(λ2)) = 0,
`2(λ2)f ′2(λ
2)− `′2(λ2)((1/A)f1(λ1) + f2(λ2)) = 0;
(iii) the functions ki = hi/gi, i = 1, 2, satisfy the linear second order differential equations
∀i = 1, 2, −ρiki(x) + 12(σ
2(x)k′i(x))
′ = 0.
We have a lot of information about the problem and the question is whether this is enough
to obtain a solution to the HJB equation for the value function of each player i, i = 1, 2,
which is given by
−ρiV i(x) + max
ui∈R
{
hi(x)`i(ui) + (V i)′(x)(g1(x)f1(u1) + g2(x)f2(u2))
}
+
σ2(x)
2
(V i)′′(x) = 0,
since we are considering stationary Markov strategies. At first sight is not apparent what
the solution is; it is even difficult to get an idea of the explicit form of this non linear
equation, given that the maximization cannot be done explicitly. Let us turn our attention
to the system (13) for the MPNE which, in contradistinction, is always explicit. Recalling
the notation introduced in Theorem 3.1 we have
Γi(x, u1, u2) = − `
′
i(u
i)
f ′i(ui)
ki(x), i = 1, 2,
H1(x, u1, u2) = h1(x)
f ′1(u1)
(
`1(u1)f ′1(u
1)− `′1(u1)
(
f1(u1) +Af2(u2)
))
,
H2(x, u1, u2) = h2(x)
f ′2(u2)
(
`2(u2)f ′2(u
2)− `′2(u2)
(
(1/A)f1(u1) + f2(u2)
))
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and then Hi(x, λ1, λ2) = 0, i = 1, 2, for all x ∈ R, by (ii). If we look at equations (13), we
see that the constant profile of strategies (λ1, λ2) is a solution if
∀i = 1, 2, ∀x ∈ R, `
′
i(λ
i)
f ′i(λi)
(
− ρiki(x) + 12(σ
2(x)k′i(x))
′
)
= 0,
and this is asserted in (iii). The solution of the HJB system is thus, according to (31) and
(32),
V i(x) = − 1
2ρi
`′i(λ
i)
f ′i(λi)
σ2(x)k′i(x),
i = 1, 2, by (iii). Further assumptions on the coefficient functions would imply that the
constant profile (λ1, λ2) is a MPNE of the stochastic differential game and that V i, i = 1, 2,
are the value functions. Once this solution is known, it is obvious that (u1, u2) = (λ1, λ2) is
the maximizing argument in the HJB system, but without this knowledge, it is difficult to
guess a tentative form for the solution. Thus the system of PDEs (13) has allowed to solve
the game because it directly characterizes the MPNE.
A particular case appears when the game is symmetric, ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ, h1 = h2 = h,
`1 = `2 = `, f1 = f2 = f0, g1 = g2 = g. In this case we look for symmetric Nash equilibria,
u1 = u2 = λ. The dimension of problem is reduced and the value functions are identical,
V 1 = V 2 = V . Thus conditions (ii), (iii) are simply
`f ′0 − 2`′f0 = 0, −ρk +
1
2
(σ2k′)′ = 0,
respectively, where k1 = k2 = k; and the value function is
V (x) = − 1
2ρ
`′(λ)
f ′0(λ)
σ2(x)k′(x).
These conditions can be extended for the symmetric MPNE in N–person games. In partic-
ular, (ii) becomes `f ′0 −N`′f0 = 0 and (iii) remains the same.
Example 5.1 As an specific example, consider the N–player symmetric game with h(x) =
xδ, `(u) = (au + b)1−1/a, g(x) = x, f0(u) = (µ/N − u) and σ(x) = σx, with δ > 1, a > 1,
µ ≥ 0 and σ > 0. The game is defined
max
ui
E
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtξδ(aui + b)1−1/a dt
subject to dξ = ξ(s)
(
µ −∑Ni=1 ui(s)) ds + σξ(s) dw(s). This formulation models the non–
cooperative exploitation of a renewable resource x in free access by N identical agents that
derive utility both from the consumption rate and the stock level. The dynamics shows a
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technology that makes costly to obtain the resource as it becomes scarce. We are supposing
that the recruitment function is linear.
Notice that (i) defines A = 1. If the constants ρ, σ and δ are linked by the relation
ρ = (1/2)(δ − 1)δσ2, then (iii) holds. Imposing (ii), we find
λ =
b− (1− a)µ
a(N − 1)−N ,
which is valid for a(N−1)−N 6= 0, and is non–negative for suitable values of the parameters
involved. The value function is V (x) = (1/δ)(aλ+ b)1−1/axδ.
5.3 Competition for consumption of a productive asset
Consider N agents in an economy that choose consumption in an optimal way, knowing
that the productive asset is stochastic. Given the non–stationary Markov strategy c−i of
the remainder players, the ith agent chooses consumption ci to maximize the expected total
utility of consumption, discounted at rate ρi > 0 and over a fixed time horizon [0, T ],
J i(t, x; (c1, . . . , cN ) = Etx
{∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)Li(ci(s)) ds+ e−ρ
i(T−t)Si(ξ(T ))
}
, (36)
subject to
dξ(s) =
(
F (ξ(s))−
N∑
i=1
ci(s)
)
ds+ σ(ξ(s))dw(s), ξ(t) = x. (37)
That is, the stock ξ(s) of the asset is consumed at rate c1(s)+ · · ·+cN (s). The drift includes
also the production/recruitment function F (x) and the diffusion is given by function σ(x).
We assume that there is only one source of uncertainty, thus d = 1. Given an initial stock
x, the asset process obeys the SDE above. The class of admissible strategies is given as in
Definition 2.1, but incorporating the obvious condition ci ≥ 0 for each player i. We suppose
that both the instantaneous utility Li and bequest function Si are smooth enough for the
computations below; moreover, Li is supposed to be strictly concave.
It is easy to obtain the N GEEs for MPNE in this game (36), (37) from (13). All what
is needed is Hamiltonian and the adjoint function of each player.
Hamiltonian: H i(x, c1, . . . , cN , pi) = Li(ci) +
(
F (x)−
N∑
i=1
ci(s)
)
pi,
Adjoint function: Γi(x, c1, . . . , cN ) = (Li)′(ci).
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Then the GEE system (13) for this game is
∀i = 1, . . . , N, −ρi(Li)′+∂t(Li)′+∂x
Li +
F (x)− N∑
j=1
cj
 (Li)′ + 1
2
σ2(x)(Li)′′cix
 = 0,
(38)
with final condition
ci(T, x) not.= ϕi(x) =
{
((Li)′)−1((Si)′(x)), if x > 0;
0, if x = 0.
(39)
In the infinite horizon case with stationary Markov strategies the system is also valid,
and the terms ∂t(Li)′ can be deleted. It is obvious for this example that the comments
placed just below Proposition 3.1 apply, since (Li)′′ < 0 and Li is independent of the
consumption of the remaining players. Thus, in this game there is no possibility of jumps
in the first order derivatives of the equilibrium strategies.
After taking total derivatives, (38) takes the following form: ∀i = 1, . . . , N
cit +
F (x)− N∑
j=1
cj + σ′(x)σ(x)
 cix + 12σ(x)2E i2(ci)(cix)2 + 12σ(x)2cixx
+
ρi − F ′(x) + N∑
j=1,j 6=i
cjx
 E i1(ci) = 0,
(40)
where E i1(ci) = −(Li)′/(Li)′′ and E i2(ci) = (Li)′′′/(Li)′′. The system obtained is coupled,
since in equation i appears also the strategies of the remainder players, c−i, but the second
order derivatives, which appear linearly, only are affected by player i. In the symmetric
case, L1 = · · · = LN = L, S1 = · · · = SN = S, ρ1 = · · · = ρN = ρ, E1j = · · · = ENj = Ej ,
j = 1, 2, and U1 = · · · = UN = U , the symmetric MPNE leads, after rearrangement, to the
single GEE
ct +
(
F (x)−Nc+ (N − 1)E1(c) + σ′(x)σ(x)
)
cx +
1
2
σ(x)2E2(c)c2x +
1
2
σ(x)2cxx
+
(
ρ− F ′(x)
)
E1(c) = 0.
(41)
In Section 5.3.1 below we will obtain analytical optimal solutions in the symmetric case
and, in Section 5.3.2, solve an inverse problem related with the certainty equivalence prin-
ciple. Besides theoretical work related with existence, uniqueness and sensitivity analysis
the set of GEEs (40) allows for implementation of numerical algorithms. Several suitable
methods can be found in e.g. Judd (1998).
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Smooth solutions of the GEE system are automatically MPNE (if they are admissible
in the sense of Definition (2.1)) when the utility functions Li are all polynomially bounded
(see Theorem 4.1), since the Hamiltonian of each player is concave in its own variable.
5.3.1 Analytical solution
Suppose L(c) = Nc1/N , where N is the number of players. This case has been considered
in Dockner and Sorger (1996) in a deterministic framework and infinite horizon. These
authors show existence of (non–smooth) infinitely many MPNE; see also Sorger (1998) for
an extension to more general isoelastic utility functions.
We prove here that in the stochastic case it is still possible to give a closed form solution
to the problem in the finite horizon case. We left aside the infinite horizon case for further
research. With the above specifications, E1(c) = (N/(N − 1))c, and E2(c) = (1/N − 2)c−1,
thereby the GEE (41) becomes
ct +
(
F (x) + σ′(x)σ(x)
)
cx +
1
2
( 1
N
− 2
)
σ(x)2
c2x
c
+
1
2
σ(x)2cxx +
N
N − 1
(
ρ− F ′(x)
)
c = 0.
with the final condition (39), c(T, x) = ϕ(x) = S′(x)N/(1−N). Let us consider the change of
variable Ψ = c1/N−1. A simple computation shows that Ψ satisfies the linear PDE
Ψt +
(
F (x) + σ′(x)σ(x)
)
Ψx +
1
2
σ(x)2Ψxx −
(
ρ− F ′(x)
)
Ψ = 0. (42)
Proposition 5.2 If a smooth symmetric MPNE exists, then it must be given by the expres-
sion
c(t, x) =
(
Etx
{
e
∫ T
t (ρ−F ′(X(s)) dsS′(X(T ))
})N/(1−N)
, (43)
where X satisfies the SDE
dX(s) =
(
F (X(s)) + (σ′σ)(X(s))
)
ds+ σ(X(s)) dw0(s), X(t) = x,
where w0 is a one dimensional standard Brownian motion.
Proof. It is a simple consequence of the Feynman–Kac formula applied to the PDE (42)
with final condition Ψ(T, x) = S′(x); see e.g. Yong and Zhou (1999), p. 373. ¤
We can provide a more explicit expression than (43) in some specific cases. For instance,
suppose that F (x) = µx with µ ≥ 0 and that σ(x) = σx with σ > 0. Then, since
X(s) = xe(µ+
1
2
σ2)(s−t)+σw0(s) for s ≥ t, and w0(s)/
√
s has a standard normal distribution,
(43) yields (with η = N/(1−N))
c(t, x) =
∫ ∞
−∞
S′
(
xe(µ+
1
2
σ2)(T−t)+σz
) e(ρ−µ)(T−t)+ −z22(T−t)√
2pi(T − t) dz
η ,
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that is,
c(t, x) = eη(ρ−µ)(T−t)(2pi(T − t))−η/2
(∫ ∞
−∞
S′
(
xe(µ+
1
2
σ2)(T−t)+σz
)
e
−z2
2(T−t)dz
)η
.
5.3.2 Inverse problem for robust MPNE
Our purpose is to apply our results for solving a certain class of inverse problems, which are
related with the certainty equivalence principle. In our specific setting, the inverse problem
can be described as follows: given the productive asset evolution (37), find strictly concave
and strictly increasing utility functions L, S, such that the game admits a robust equilib-
rium. These type of problems are significant in economics, since that when a policy function
can be rationalized by a “well behaved” utility function, it means that the prescribed be-
havior is consistent with an optimizing behavior. Relevant papers in the topic are Kurz
(1969) and Chang (1988), but in the single–agent case. Inverse problems are easily handled
with the GEE, since it characterizes directly the MPNE. Note that the HJB equation is
not well suited for this class of problems, since they require knowledge both of the value
function and the prescribed control law.
By concision of the paper we consider only the infinite horizon case, since similar results
are obtained for the finite horizon case. The GEE (38) in this case for stationary (ct = 0),
symmetric MPNE is
−ρL′(c) + ∂x
(
L(c) + (F (x)−Nc)L′(c) + 1
2
σ(x)2∂xL′(c)
)
= 0. (44)
By Proposition 5.1, the necessary condition (33) for a robust MPNE is σ(x)2∂xL′(c(x))
constant. Since we want to find explicit expressions, let us suppose that σ(x) = σx, with
σ > 0. Then, integrating with respect to x, we get L′(c(x)) = A/x + B, where A, B are
constants (see (35)). Thus
L(c) = A
∫ c dy
ζ(y)
+Bc, (45)
where ζ is the inverse of the consumption function with respect to x, i.e. x = ζ(c(x)), that
we suppose that exists globally. For this to be true, it suffices that the consumption function
be strictly increasing in (positive) wealth, which is a plausible economic assumption. From
L′(c) = A/x + B we can obtain the second derivative L′′(c) = −A/(x2cx(t, x)), thus L is
strictly concave if and only if A > 0, because, as pointed out above, we are supposing that
c is strictly increasing in wealth. On the other hand, A > 0 and B ≥ 0 makes L strictly
increasing in the relevant region x > 0, thus we impose these conditions on A and B.
To determine L explicitly from (45), it is necessary to find ζ. Here we suppose that
F (x) = µx, with µ ≥ 0. We begin finding c, observing that it is also a solution to the
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deterministic problem, thus it must be a solution of (44) with σ = 0. This GEE can be
explicitly solved once L′(c) = A/x + B is substituted into, obtaining a linear ODE for c
with non–constant coefficients: c′(x) + P (x)c(x) +Q(x) = 0, where
P (x) =
−NA
(N − 1)(Ax+Bx2) , Q(x) =
1
N − 1
(
ρ− µBx
A+Bx
)
.
It remain the task of determining further conditions on A and B such that the solution
remains positive and strictly increasing in the region x > 0. Once this is assured the
problem is finished, with L given in (45). We do not pursue here to attain this generality,
but showing instead some explicit examples. Consequently, suppose B = 0. Then it is easy
to find the solution c(x) = ρx +DxN/(N−1), where D is another (non–negative) constant.
Let us distinguish two cases.
• D = 0 and N general. The consumption is linear, c(x) = ρx, so that ζ(c) = c/ρ.
Substituting into (45) we find a logarithmic utility, L(c) = Aρ ln c, where A is an
arbitrary, positive constant. The asset evolves according to the SDE
dξ(s) = (µ−Nρ)ξ(s)ds+ σξ(s)dw(s), ξ(0) = x,
that is a geometric Brownian motion
ξ(t) = xe(µ−Nρ−σ
2/2)t+σw(t), t ≥ 0.
The value functions of the deterministic (V det) and stochastic problems are easily
found from Remark 4.3 to be
V det(x) = A lnx+A
(
ln ρ+
µ
ρ
−N
)
,
V (x) = V det(x)− Aσ
2
2ρ
,
respectively.
• N = 2 and D > 0. The robust MPNE is a quadratic function of x, ĉ(t, x) = ρx+Dx2,
so that ζ is given by ζ(c) = −ρ+
√
ρ2+4Dc
2D and the bi–parametric family of increas-
ing and strictly concave utility functions that rationalize the quadratic consumption
function for both the stochastic and the deterministic problem is
L(c) = Aρ ln
(√
ρ2 + 4Dc− ρ
)
+A
√
ρ2 + 4Dc,
with A > 0 and D > 0 arbitrary constants.
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Because the game is symmetric, the asset evolves as
dξ(s) =
(
(µ−Nρ)ξ(s)−NDξ2(s)) ds+ ξ(s)σdw(s), ξ(0) = x.
The solution to this nonlinear SDE is (see e.g. Øksendal (2003), p. 78)
ξ(t) =
e(µ−Nρ−
1
2
σ2)t+σw(t)
1
x +ND
∫ t
0 e
(µ−Nρ− 1
2
σ2)s+σw(s) ds
, t ≥ 0.
The explicit expressions for the value functions are
V det(x) = A lnx+A
(
ln(2D) +
µ
ρ
− 1
)
,
V (x) = V det(x)− Aσ
2
2ρ
.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a new perspective for the analysis of stochastic differential games.
Instead of the classical method based on HJB equation, we propose the system of GEEs
which directly characterizes the MPNE. The main contributions of the paper are to provide
a systematic way to find GEE in general stochastic differential games and to establish
a sufficient condition in terms of this new system of PDEs. Further research should be
directed to extend the methodology to games where the diffusion coefficient of the state
process depends on the strategies of players, and to apply the method to the study of
models in economics and operations research.
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